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But know, thou noble youth,
The serpent that did sting thy father’s life
Now wears his crown.
William Shakespeare
G hosts and other spectral creatures have always meddledwith state politics. In ancient Denmark, at a time in whichsomething was rotten in the state, Prince Hamlet famously
had the ghost of his own father telling him the whole story of the con-
spiracies that had recently shaken the kingdom, and prescribing him
what to do to redress the situation. Success may vary. In modern Italy,
at a time in which the heart of the state was under attack, a séance of
ghosts gave indications about where to find the chief of the Red
Brigades during the armed group’s fifty-five day abduction of the
Christian Democrats’ chairman Aldo Moro, but that information was
squandered when the government sent the police to the small country
town of Gradoli, instead of Via Gradoli in Rome. In more recent times,
however, historians have also been detecting the presence of ghosts in
international affairs. This essay is concerned with English-language
Cold War historiography. The first section shows that the presence of
ghosts in the foreign policy decision making processes of both the
United States and the Soviet Union has been detected mainly in rela-
tively recent works. The second, third and fourth sections are dedicat-
ed to distinguishing between three different kinds of apparitions—
ghosts of the past, specters of the future, and phantasmagorias, respec-
tively. The concluding section attempts some reflections on the possi-
ble meanings of such interest of Cold War historiography for spectral
figures, particularly in connection with the ongoing debates about the
“very notion of Cold War.”1
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1. On the recent apparitions of ghosts in Cold War historiography
Cold War historiography is a complex field, whose specialists have
been spending a growing amount of time in recent years trying to iden-
tify with clarity their very subject of inquiry. 2 One would be tempted
to say that the Cold War itself is a sort of ghost, if it weren’t for the fact
that the “elephant in the room” has already occupied the place of uni-
versally accepted metaphor for the Cold War in the age when the Cold
War itself does not have a universally accepted definition (and yes: it
would have definitely been great if elephant had contained the same
root as phantom, but ancient Greeks were not so diabolical after all, and
the two words are actually unrelated to each other).3 In any case, it is in
this complex environment that ghosts have begun to show up, irre-
spective of the chosen approach to the subject: ghosts appear increas-
ingly as explanatory factors for policy in the interpretations of crucial
phases of the “Cold War,” when the phrase is intended as a shortcut to
indicate the ideological and strategic “bipolar confrontation” centered
on the US and the Soviet Union between 1945-47 and 1989-91; ghosts
populate the studies of “Cold War” social, cultural and political
processes, that is, processes that occurred throughout the world in the
years between 1945 and 1989, but which did not necessarily bear any
direct relationship to the confrontation between Washington and
Moscow; finally, and possibly more interestingly, ghosts are crucial
actors in the studies dedicated to the making of the Cold War proper,
that is the US policy of war short of actual war vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union between 1947 and 1963.4
Before any detailed analysis is made, it is important to clarify one
point: it has not always been like this. Ghostly apparitions were quite
rare to early Cold War historians. The so-called “orthodox” historians,
most of them based in the US, interpreted the origins of the “Cold War”
principally in terms of the US’s moral and rational reactions to the
intrinsically immoral, Marxist-Leninist-driven deeds of the Soviets. To
the extent that elements of uncertainty, partiality of view, and subjectiv-
ity are taken into account, it appears that policymakers from both the
US and the USSR acted based on “memories” and “prospects”, some-
times “mirages.”5 Thus, the only ghost that features in W.H. McNeill’s
America Britain Russia—the “ghost of diversion [of US troops] to the
Pacific” that haunted British policymakers in 1944—was not directly
related to the brewing US-Soviet tension (McNeill 197). No ghosts show
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up in Herbert Feis’s Trust to Terror, nor in Arthur Schlesinger’s essay on
“The Origins of the Cold War.” Winston Churchill’s claim at Yalta
(February 1945), that France should have a zone of occupation in
Germany because he did not want to see “the specter of Germany at the
Channel ports” again, is quoted verbatim by Feis in Churchill Roosevelt
Stalin (531), but it is not clear whether or not the historian trusted
Churchill’s version of the story.6 As for Thomas Bailey’s America Faces
Russia, the quip that in late 1946 the “ghost of Hitler must have laughed
ghoulishly to see the democratic west building up Germany against
Communist Russia” merely hints at a hypothetical apparition, with no
claim whatsoever to an actual one (Bailey 327).7
The so-called “revisionists” interpreted US policy as being tragical-
ly positioned at the intersection between a structurally expansionist
political economy and the idealistic convictions nurtured by Wa sh -
ington’s policymakers about themselves. Where the Soviets ap pear -
ed, which was not always the case, they were largely represented as
cool-minded realists (which, of course, was not always the case
either). In spite of the fact that—ever since the apparition of the ghost
of Darius in Aeschylus’s Persians—tragedies had been excellent
ghost-spotting sites for more than 2000 years, William Appleman
Williams’s Tragedy of American Diplomacy only reports two cases of
unconfirmed apparitions, with the author simply quoting the words
of others: namely, Herbet Hoover’s claim in the 1920s that “Com -
munist Russia was a specter which wandered into the [Ver sail les]
Peace Conference almost daily,” and Senator J. William Fulbright’s
claim in 1958 that “the spectre of Soviet Communism” had often been
used in previous years by US policymakers “as a cloak for [their own]
failure” (Williams 81 and 12 respectively). However, the aforemen-
tioned chasm between fact and perception did allow the revisionists
to provide greater space for visual complexities. Thus, “nightmares”
of the Great Depression do play a crucial role in Williams’s explana-
tion of American foreign policy (Williams 202-275), just as “illusions”
and “day dreams” shaped US foreign policy throughout D.E.
Fleming’s The Cold War and Its Origins.8 And then, finally, a true ghost
was spotted. This happened in 1972, with the publication of The
Limits of Power by Joyce and Gabriel Kolko: it was the “specter of
depression,” who advised the Truman administration about the need
to push for open markets and an open confrontation with the global
Left (Kolko and Kolko 20).  
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Whatever its other merits and shortcomings, the Kolkos’ volume
open ed a brief period when ghostly apparitions became rather usual in
reference to US policy between 1944 and 1953: Thomas Campbell men-
tioned the “specter of isolationism” as an influential force in the US at
the time of the creation of the United Nations;9 Gaddis Smith dedicat-
ed an entire essay to the role played by the “ghost of Hitler” in shap-
ing US policy;10 a very important specter, that of communism, showed
up prominently in the title of a work about the repression and margin-
alization of the Left in the United States;11 finally, in his book about the
“uses and misuses of history,” Ernest May explained some of Franklin
Roosevelt’s positions during the final phases of World War Two by
claiming that “the ghost of Woodrow Wilson was at his shoulder” (7).
How ever, in a rather interesting combination with the onset and
denouement of the “second cold war,”12 ghosts disappeared from new
Cold War scholarship for a while: no ghosts showed up in John Lewis
Gad dis’s so-called “post-revisionist synthesis,” just as there had been
no ghosts in Strategies of containment by the same author.13 It was only
after the mid-1980s that ghosts and specters became usual characters in
Cold War historiography. 
2. Ghosts of the past
Grand narratives are said to have died a natural death at some point by
the end of the 1970s.14 Interestingly, it was right after such death, that
ghosts began to appear massively to Cold War historians (and not only
to them, since Ivan Reitman’s Ghostbusters was one of the most success-
ful movies of the 1980s). This occurred in three main forms. The first
was ghosts of the past, that is when the dead appear to the living.
These may be called “specters” as well, but technically they are the
truest forms of ghosts and seem to have been particularly active in the
phase that is usually referred to as that of the “origins of the Cold War,”
particularly between 1945 and 1953. 
After the relatively rare apparitions of the mid-1970s, one of the first
instances in which ghosts from the past were presented as primary
actors of the post-World War Two years came in Michael Hunt’s 1987
study of “ideology” in the making of US foreign policy. In explaining
the choices of the Truman administration, Hunt wrote that “the ghosts
of Hitler lying in wait at Munich and Tojo plotting the attack on Pearl
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Harbor haunted the memory of cold warriors and were regularly con-
jured up to emphasize the dangers of unpreparedness and appease-
ment” (151). Several years later, the intuition that a focus on ideology—
something so intimately connected with the act of seeing—would lead
to detect ghosts was retained by David Engerman in his contribution to
the Cambridge History of the Cold War, where both sides appear to have
had their ghostly apparitions: first comes the claim that “each side con-
cluded, according to its own ideological dispositions, that the specter
of Nazism outlasted Hitler”; and then comes the conclusion that “each
side claimed to find the Nazi specter in the other” (Engerman 31 and
35). Indeed, the ghosts of Hitler’s Germany appeared to virtually all
the players: for example, Melvyn Leffler called them into question to
summarize the French position in the immediate post war period,
claiming that “most of all, they wanted security guarantees against the
immediate prospect of Soviet retaliation and the protracted specter of
German aggression” (2010, 80). The same ghosts could even play into
Soviet hands, to the extent that Stalin was skeptical about the US pro-
posal to demilitarize Germany in late 1945: according to Vladimir
Pechatnov, the Soviet dictator was “concerned with the corrosive effect
such a treaty might have on building a system of bilateral security
guarantees with his clients in Eastern Europe, since the specter of
German revanchism bound them together” (98).
3. Specters of the future
The second type of spectral figures which appeared with increasing
frequency in Cold War historiography after the mid-1980s are specters
of the future. These are politically dreadful to the beholders, but do not
come from the reign of the dead. This is of course the case with Melvyn
Leffler’s 1994 volume entitled the Specter of Communism. The same
author also wrote about Churchill’s “iron curtain speech” of 5 March
1946, that “the former British prime minister recommended that
Anglo-Saxons unite to withstand the new totalitarian specter” (ibid.
72). Writing about the origins of the Marshall plan, Charles Maier con-
tends that “it was th[e] specter of impending economic breakdown, as
well as the failure at Moscow in April [1947], that led American policy
makers to give up their hope or illusion that recovery lay just ahead”
(211). In turn, in trying to make sense of Stalin’s often inconsistent
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views between 1947 and 1949, Vojtech Mastny saw that “while the
specter of war was never far from the Soviet mind, the changing esti-
mates of its probability nevertheless made a difference” (60). Finally,
Vladislav Zubok noted that “in both the Soviet ‘metropolis’ and the
Polish ‘satellite’ late Stalinism did everything to extinguish the specter
of cultural autonomy and freethinking” (90).
Unlike the ghosts of the past, the specters of the future seem to have
been a prominent feature of the entire “Cold War” between 1945 and
1991, adapting rather well to the gradual turning of the original, exis-
tential Cold War into a more “traditional” great power rivalry after the
mid-1950s. In particular, a large number of specters of the future has
been found by historians when looking at the interaction between the
“Cold War” and the “Third World.” Nixon’s Nuclear Specter is, for exam-
ple, the title of William Burr and Jeffrey Kimball’s recent work on the
US Vietnam War. In 1986 Robert Wood contended that “the specter of
communist aid led the United States to press the OEEC countries [...] to
initiate or expand their own aid programs” (71).  In 1987 Michael Hunt
made the case that the wave of radicalism and unrest that rolled across
Latin America, Africa and Asia in the 1960s “raised for American lead-
ers the specter of Soviet meddling at the same time that it directly chal-
lenged American values” (161). In 1989, H.W. Brands entitled his work
on the emergence of the “Third World” nothing less than The Specter of
Neutralism. Finally, John Lewis Gaddis, in his own “neo-orthodox” re -
incarnation, saw that “the victory of communism in Cuba—and the
prospect that that triumph might repeat itself elsewhere in the ‘third
world’—raised a specter of Western vulnerabilities” (1997, 189). More
recently, Douglas Little has highlighted that by halting Britain’s armed
intervention in Suez the Eisenhower administration “removed the
specter of Soviet troops in the Middle East” (309), and Matthew Con -
nel ly has written that a mix between the “Cold War” and “the specter
of North–South conflict” led the United States to work indirectly
through NGOs and international organizations in the 1970s (480).
Further, from the work of literary historian Andrea Carosso we know
that the “specter of female alienation” contributed to shaping Cold War
Narratives in the US in the 1950s (128). But also Moscow had its appari-
tions: according to Sergey Radchenko, by 1964 “the specter of Chinese
territorial claims to the underpopulated and yet strategically essential
Siberia and Far East shocked Soviet leaders” (357). The list could go on
further, but hopefully the point is clear. 
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4. Phantasmagorias
The third category of apparitions is phantasmagorias. Literally an
“assembly of ghosts,” the term first appeared in France in the last de -
cade of the 18th century, to indicate a show of optical illusions pro-
duced in a dark room by means of a “magic lantern” concealed from
the view of the audience. The term, and the related adjective “phantas-
magorical” were successively popularized in a metaphorical accepta-
tion and came to mean a “constantly shifting complex succession of
things seen or imagined.”15 To the extent that urban life exposed the
subject to such aesthetic experience, Walter Benjamin considered
“phanta smagoria” as a synonym of modernity itself.16
Both the historical and the metaphorical acceptation of phantas-
magoria recur in recent Cold War historiography. Consistently with
their very nature, the two acceptations sometimes appear to overlap,
but should nevertheless be kept separated from a conceptual stand-
point: the former emphasizes the very fact that many of the things that
were seen and imagined during the “Cold war” were actually pro-
duced as optical illusions, through discourse and representation (how
things are seen and imagined is crucial here); the latter stresses the
bizarre nature, and undefined mix of things seen and imagined, that
was typical of the language and representations of the US-Soviet con-
frontation (what is seen and imagined is crucial here). In any case,
unlike with regular ghosts, to detect a phantasmagoria is to detect a
human artifact.
Indeed, it is hard not to remark the startling consonance between the
“constantly shifting images” that constitute a phantasmagoria, and the
“constantly shifting geographical and political points” at which, accord-
ing to George Kennan, the US should exert the “containment” of the
Soviet Union—that is, should fight a Cold War against the Soviet Union.
While this linguistic quasi-coincidence has not been underlined as such,
the phantasmagorical nature of the US’s Cold War (not necessarily of
the “Cold War”) is the subject of much of Anders Stephanson’s work.
After recalling the accusation that Voltaire had once made to
Montesquieu’s representation of the Ottoman empire—“he had ‘made
for himself a hideous phantom in order to fight against it’”—
Stephanson has convincingly argued that in 1946-47 the Truman admin-
istration converged onto replicating the same procedure vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union (2005, 89). Not simply did Truman present his “doctrine”
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with the documented aim to “scare the hell out of the American people”
by positing axiomatically the Soviet Union’s inherent need to follow in
the Nazi foreign policy footsteps; by grouping together a set of local ten-
sions—as diverse as those that were taking place in Italy, Poland, Greece
and Turkey—and Moscow’s horror record of domestic repression under
the single heading of the struggle between Moscow and “the free peo-
ples of the world,” Truman and his advisers were also “producing” a
powerful imaginary which was essential to the “war-like but short of
actual war” climate of the late 1940s and 1950s.17 In any case, according
to Stephanson, what had phantasmagorical features in 1946-47, became
pure “cold-war phantasmagoria” after 1949, namely with NSC-68’s car-
icature of the (alleged) “Kremlin’s design” for “world domination.”18
Most of the phantasmagoria is detected in the US, either within the
context of studies that take a culturalist perspective on foreign policy
making, or within that of studies of “Cold War” culture. For example,
while at times also referring to symmetrical processes at work in the
Soviet Union, it is the contrast between the daily “invisibility” of the
huge US nuclear complex and the undeletable images of atomic explo-
sions impressed on the retinas of all American citizens by ever-present
TV-sets, that leads Joseph Masco to conclude that “for Cold Warriors,
the phantasmagoria of nuclear conflict provoked an imagination that
was prolific.” In turn, this would lead to “the constant overestimation
of the nature of the Soviet nuclear threat by US government officials”
(16). Of course, Richard Hofstadter’s “paranoid style in American pol-
itics” looms large over this approach, but specific phantasmagorical
features of Hollywood’s post-war productions have also been detected:
Tony Shaw gave a nuanced response to the question as to how much
US cinema produced “spectres” detached from reality; Bernard Dick
openly detected phantasmagoria in such movies as the Red Menace
(1949) and Invasion USA (1952); and Michael Rogin claimed that “the
cold war” introduced a new moment in the history of “American
demonology” (Shaw 48).19 Finally, phantasmagoria is the central word
throughout the long essay dedicated by Irina Sandomirskaya to the
analysis of Alfred Hitchcock’s North by Northwest (1959) and Carol
Reed’s The Third Man (1949), where “cinematic Russia acquires a histo-
ry as a grotesque phantom and one of those monsters that are pro-
duced by the sleeping (or dreaming) reason of Modernity” (Sando -
mirskaya 131). It is also with an eye to these elements of the “hegemon-
ic culture” prevailing in the US, that Walter Hixson reached the conclu-
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sion that “the ‘Soviet threat’ to West European and ultimately US secu-
rity was a Cold War construction. Yet the public, conditioned by mem-
ories of Hitler, internalized the specter of a Red Army invasion, which
prevailed for generations” (Hixson 176).
On the contrary, Cold war historians have detected fewer phantas-
magorias in the Soviet Union. One of the few—if not the only—men-
tions of phantasmagoria as referred to the Soviet image of the US can
be found, somewhat paradoxically, in a literary analysis of a relatively
benign Soviet work of fiction from the 1970s (Rogachevskii 40).
5. Conclusive thoughts
When in the early 1980s the celebrated author of children’s literature,
Roald Dahl, ventured to select the best ghost stories of all time, he
quickly found himself overwhelmed by the material he had to read.
According to his own account in The Book of Ghost Stories, by the end of
his “reading marathon” he had read a total of 749 stories, authored by
perfect unknowns as well as by recognized literary celebrities (Dahl
10).20 Since not all authors are mentioned by name, it is not possible to
know whether or not the list included the Cold War historians who, by
the mid-1970s, had already detected ghosts at work in and around the
US-Soviet relationship. What is known, is that only a few years after
Dahl’s book, ghosts began to populate Cold War historiography en
masse. The tone of this essay has tried to be somewhat humorous so far,
but such a massive wave of apparitions does pose some questions
about recent trends in Cold War historiography.
First, if one accepts the basic notion that such apparitions are
metaphors and not actual sightings, it is hard not to ask what deter-
mined the widespread adoption of spectral language after the mid-
1980s. With few exceptions, that concern to a large extent those who
have worked on detecting phantasmagorias, the choice of spectral lan-
guage is not explained. It seems, for example, that ghosts of the past
have quietly flanked or taken over the previous “memories.” But in
fact, the change is far from being neutral on the account: memory is the
ability to recall what has been learned, has a certain degree of fixity and
is not associated with any particular feeling. To the extent that histori-
ans are able to ascribe policy or attitudes to the documented memories
of the past, held by the human subjects of their inquiry, they acknowl-
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edge the presence of a general outlook in the minds of those who share
such memories, and the general influence of such outlook on the for-
mulation of policy and rhetoric. When it comes to ghosts, however, the
focus passes from the subjects who carry memories to the object of their
views: besides the higher degree of dramatization that this confers to
the account, what is preeminent here is the act of seeing a past enemy,
presumably a mortal one, in the clothes of a specific present interlocu-
tor, who then causes fear. If this is so, this does not seem to be an equal-
ly rational behavior. That the use of spectral language by the historian
reflects a perceived element of irrationality of the policymakers seems
sometimes more consciously affirmed when the chosen metaphor is
the specter of the future: as is clear from the subtitle, Burr and
Kimball’s volume on Nixon’s Nuclear Specter is, for example, a close
examination of what Nixon himself called his “madman diplomacy” in
Vietnam. As for the “specter of [western] vulnerability” raised by the
Cuban revolution, Gaddis admits that it was “so powerful that it
would push the United States, during the early 1960s, into an ambi-
tiously ill-conceived campaign” (1997, 189). In most cases, however,
both for the ghosts of the past and the specters of the future, the read-
er can only infer whether the new language reflects—if anything—new
specific findings or, rather, a different philosophical outlook by the his-
torians themselves, who now unconsciously attribute a much bigger
role to irrationality, in the making of history, than their colleagues from
the previous generation would have tolerated.21 If the latter were the
case, of course, the ghostly visions in recent Cold War historiography
would be telling much more about the historians than about the stories
they tell.22
As anticipated above, there are exceptions. Historians concerned
with phantasmagorias trace the genesis of the specters they detect to
specific “constructions,” which pass through public discourse and rep-
resentation. But of course, just as the passage from memory and per-
spective to ghosts and specters is not neutral on the story that is being
told, neither is the choice between ghosts and phantasmagorias neu-
tral, for it is clear that at least some of the ghosts and specters detected
in the second and third sections above, were most likely the images
resulting from the phantasmagorias detected in the fourth. From this
standpoint, by publicly associating current Soviet foreign policy with
the Nazi foreign policy of the 1930s, Churchill’s “iron curtain speech”
(and Truman’s hands-clapping to it) could possibly be taken as the
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most basic form of phantasmagoria. This might be true both for the
speech’s contribution to the creation of Stalin’s image as the “ghost of
Hitler” in the West, and for its contribution to the generation of a mir-
ror effect: as a matter of fact, provided that in 1946 Soviet citizens did
not need anyone to refresh their memory about their wartime suffer-
ings, Stalin’s response punctually associated Churchill’s proposal for a
US-British alliance with Hitler’s aggression.23 As noted above, howev-
er, the mechanisms—if any—through which such associations came to
be built and internalized have been subject to historical inquiry preva-
lently in the case of the US. As far as the Soviet side is concerned, “pro-
paganda” is still the prevailing category applied to the Soviet produc-
tion of the image of the US (and the West more generally). In a techni-
cal sense, this appears to be a warranted approach: both for stylistic
and political reasons, when cinema and literature are taken into consid-
eration, in the Soviet Union there was virtually nothing symmetric
about Hollywood’s Red Army invasions and KGB infiltrations of the
United States.24 And yet, it would be interesting to know more about
the ways in which Soviet propaganda interacted with public and pri-
vate memory in the making (and, possibly, the later unmaking) of asso-
ciations between western foreign policy and Hitler’s expansionism
(and, later, between Mao and Hitler). In any case, as witnessed by the
renewal of the debate on “the very notion of the Cold War,” the detec-
tion of phantasmagorias at least in the United States, challenges the tra-
ditional visual metaphors used in the prevailing accounts of US-Soviet
relations, which still appear largely chained to an earthly interpretive
spectrum (“depth of vision” versus “myopia”), regardless of the mas-
sive apparitions of ghosts that this essay has documented.
Notes
1. Pending such a debate, Cold War historiography is intended here as the field
composed of all those who believe they deal with the Cold War, irrespective
of how they define it. The author wishes to thank Giovanni Bernardini,
Mario Del Pero, Olga Egorova, Andrea Gullotta, and Alberto Masoero for
their useful suggestions, while obviously claiming all responsibility for any
mistakes in this essay. 
2. See Romero.
3. For the “elephant in the room” metaphor see Westad.
4. The latter definition was originally formulated and refined by Anders Ste phan -
son in three successive essays: “Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of a Cold
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War,” “Liberty or Death. The Cold War as US Ideology,” and “The Cold War
Considered as a U.S. Project.” It has later been elaborated upon by the same
author to include the mutual denial of legitimacy between the two superpow-
ers following the deployment of US “containment” policies. See Ste phan son
2012, 19-50. While acknowledging its philological merits, critics have seen in it
an excess of precision, which allegedly makes it of little operational usefulness.
See Westad; Romero, 688. This article will adopt the phrase Cold War when
referring to the US containment project, and “Cold War” when referring to
either the US-Soviet rivalry in general or the period in which it took place.
5. In Feis’s From Trust to Terror, for example, memory is the “indiscriminating
instructor [that] prodded the Americans to resist all proposals that might
make it necessary to support the German economy even more expensively”
right after World War Two (39). Prospects of “better harvests” and “peace
conferences” abound throughout the volume, and the “mirage of possible
compromise” is a main theme in the treatment of the final part of 1946 (151).
6. For the original quotation, see United States Department of State, 618. 
7. In turn, the “specter of Bolshevism” that worried US policy makers right
after 1917 ostensibly vanished after 1920. See ibid. 239-250.
8. Along the same vein, Lloyd Gardner interpreted US actions at the end of
World War Two in light of US policymakers’ “nightmare-like memories of
the depression” (Gardner, 313).
9. See Campbell.
10. See Smith.
11. See Griffith and Theoharis.
12. On the “second cold war” see Halliday.
13. See Gaddis (1982) and Gaddis (1983).
14. See Lyotard.
15. The definition is from the Merriam Webster dictionary.
16. On phantasmagoria, see Cagidemetrio 3-106.
17. Stephanson (2005); Stephanson (1999). That Truman “scare the hell out of
the American people” was of course Arthur Vandenberg’s condition for giv-
ing his support, as chairman of the US Senate’s Foreign affairs committee, to
the President’s request for funds for Greece and Turkey in 1947. See
Patterson 128.
18. Stephanson 2011, 162. To be sure, in the 1960s “the very notion of ‘interna-
tional communism’ [was] rendered increasingly phantasmagoric because of
the Sino-Soviet split” (Stephanson 2012, 136).
19. Dick; Rogin. Also Hofstadter.
20. I am particularly grateful to Gaia Basosi for bringing my attention upon this
precious book.
21. It would be interesting, for example, to learn more about Charlie Maier’s
passage from criticism of the “revisionists” to current stress on the aforemen-
tioned “specter of [European] impending economic breakdown” in the mak-
ing of the Marshall Plan. 
22. To be sure, adjectives such as “ghostly,” “phantasmatic” and “phantas-
magoric” characterize post-modernist analysis of “post-modern” society. See
24
Jameson.
23. Reference here is to Stalin’s association between Churchill and Hitler (and
the Pravda’s association between Churchill and Goebbels) in the days follow-
ing the “iron curtain speech.” See Fleming 450.
24. Indeed, there were exceptions: Feis mentions The Mad Haberdasher, a play
popular with Moscow theaters in 1949, in which the main American charac-
ter had “a strong facial resemblance with Adolf Hitler” (Feis 1970, 390). For
a commentary on some Soviet science fiction, see Rogachevskii.
25. On Khrushchev’s association between Mao and Hitler, see Radchenko 357.
26. “Depth of strategic vision” characterized George Kennan’s thinking in 1947
according to Gaddis (1982, 23). US views in the same period were “myopic”
according to Leffler (1994, 27).
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